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MECHANISM PROBLEMS
By John K. Riedel*
ABSTRACT
Too frequently during the design and development of mechanisms, problems
occur that could have been avoided if the right question had been asked before, rather
than after, the fact. Several typical problems, drawn from actual experience, are
discussed and analyzed. The lessons learned are used to generate various suggestions
for minimizing mistakes in mechanism design. These suggestions are intended to pre-
cipitate the right question at the right time; ths.t is, before, rather than after, a test
or flight failure.
INTRODUCTION
From a viewpoint of direct involvement in the design and development of various
aerospace mechanisms in the past few years, it is disconcerting to realize how often
failures or malfunctions occur. When viewed with hindsight, these problems cause one
to wonder, "how could we have overlooked that?" This question is not concerned so
much with anomalies revealed during early development testing; these anomalies are to
be expected and are even needed during the design evolution. Rather, it is the failures
that occur downstream during qualification or flight testing that are of greatest concern.
These are the failures that cause embarrassment and consternation and which will be
the subject of this report. Several examples will be cited, not only to illustrate typical
errors but, more important, the lessons learned, followed by suggestions intended to
improve future performance regarding mechanisms design. In presenting these ex-
amples, the role of design (as opposed to test and analysis) will be emphasized because
this is where the responsibility usually rests and the blame falls.
TYPICAL PROBLEMS
Diaphragm Problem
Two problems that were encountered in the development of the radar augmentation
device (RAD)(ref. 1) will be used as examples. In essence, the RAD is a self-inflating
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sphere that is used as a large reflector to facilitate early acquisition by the ground-
based radars. It is inflated with Freon that is released from a reservoir when a spring-
loaded piercer punctures a metal diaphragm at the outlet of the reservoir. It was
recognized that temperature would affect the vapor pressure of the Freon and, thus, the
rate of inflation of the sphere. Experience had indicated that, if the rate of inflation
was too fast, the sphere or balloon, would burst. Therefore, one test was conducted at
elevated temperature to verify sphere-inflation performance at the upper temperature
limit. Instead of getting rapid inflation, just the opposite was obtained. By investiga-
tion, it was subsequently established that the increased vapor pressure was sufficient
to overcome the force of the spring used to drive the piercer. As soon as the piercer
punctured the diaphragm the increased vapor pressure acted on it to force it back before
full penetration of the diaphragm was achieved. This problem is illustrated in figure 1.
Subsequent redesign, shown in figure 2, incorporated a hollow piercer; thus, the vapor
pressure could not act on it to force it back.
Orientation-Sensitivity Problem
On another occasion in the RAD program, a design flaw was discovered by "com-
ing through the back door. " In a test designed to evaluate improvement in packaging
the sphere, the unit was mounted horizontally to eliminate the influence of gravity on
sphere deployment. Deployment was satisfactory but, unaccountably, the rate of in-
flation was significantly slower than in all previous tests wherein the unit had been
inclined downward. Subsequent investigation established that the design was sensitive
to orientation. When the sphere was in the downward orientation, Freon entered the
sphere as a liquid, whereas when the sphere was in the horizontal position, Freon
entered the sphere as a vapor or gas. Thus, a much slower rate of inflation occurred
when the sphere was in the downward orientation. This problem and its solution are
illustrated in figure 3.
Moisture-Absorption Problem
In another design application, it was necessary to extend two panels radially out-
ward a short distance (approximately 7.62 centimeters (3 inches)) from the missile
during boost flight. The mechanism worked in limited ground-based tests under simu-
lated flight loads (accelerations) but malfunctioned in flight. Subsequent investigation
and ground-based testing revealed a marginal design: the actuating spring was just
barely strong enough (really, not quite strong enough) to overcome accumulated friction
forces when under maximum g loadings. In the initial design, clearances were made
generous, and the spring was thought to be stronger than necessary; thus, the friction
problem was not addressed adequately. There was another contributing factor. The
actuating rod was supported or guided by two nylon sleeve bushings. After the flight
anomaly, the materials experts suggested that these bushings swelled under long (sev-
eral months) exposure to a humid atmosphere and increased the friction. An "over-
test" on the ground may have exposed the marginal nature of the design, but the test
was not conducted until after the fact. Subsequently, design improvements were made
to minimize friction.
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To confirm the postulate that the hydrophilic property of nylon could have ad-
versely affected the operation of the actuator, an accelerated moisture-absorption test
was conducted by submerging the assembled actuator in a tank of hot water (333.15 ° K)
for approximately 3 weeks. After soaking, the actuator would not function because the
nylon bushings swelled to the extent that they squeezed the actuator shaft. Accordingly,
Rulon C (a filled tetrafluoroethylene) was used in the bushings. Rulon C is unaffected
by moisture and, in addition, has a lower coefficient of friction than does nylon.
Quantitative measurements were made in a second accelerated moisture-absorption
test in which bushings made both of nylon and Rulon C were soaked in hot water. Test
results, shown in figure 4, are indicative that the wall thickness of the nylon bushings
increased 2.5 percent, whereas the Rulon C bushings were virtually unaffected (actu-
ally shrank slightly). The original and new design configurations of the actuator are
shown in figure 4.
Series Of Problems With Module Launcher
In this example it was required that a module be mounted in a launcher in an off-
center position inside a spinning body and, upon signal, be ejected from the launch tube
by means of a spring that provided both linear and rotational motion to the module.
After a short delay (approximately 3 seconds), the module functioned. The rotational
motion produced spin stability to provide a favored orientation for the module. This
subsystem of module and launcher was tested during the development program, but in
the first test, the module was not ejected properly. Subsequent investigations re-
vealed a sequence of errors.
The launcher was simply a tube that had generous clearance so that friction was
not considered to be a problem. Two factors were overlooked here: the module did
not come out smoothly, but tended to chatter in its travel out of the tube; and the module
had a safe-arm device which, it should be noted, was always in the "safe" position
during development testing of the ejection mechanism. The safe-arm device used three
spring-loaded steel balls that were ejected radially to actuate the module when it was
free of the launch tube. In the "safe" position, the balls were constrained physically
from moving by the safe-arm device but, when in the "armed" position, the balls bore
against the side of the launch tube. Both of the factors just mentioned introduced fric-
tion; this fact probably accounted for the flight failure. Subsequently, improvements
were made to reduce friction. These improvements included a redesign of the safe-
arm device so that the balls were ejected by centrifugal force caused by the module
spin rather than by a separate spring; thus, friction on the inside of the launch tube
was largely eliminated.
During this development, ejection tests were conducted vertically downward to
eliminate the effects of gravity on the tumbling motion of the module. In flight tests,
the module was ejected in a gravity-free environment. This environment (that is, lack
of gravity), incidentally, invariably complicates ground-based testing and often leads
to errors. In arriving at the true separation velocity, the effect of the force of gravity
was subtracted, which, in some cases yielded a negative separation velocity, clearly
an impossibility. This proved to be a testing error: the ejection spring was found to
be time dependent (as is any spring); thus, the module actually was falling away from
the spring.
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At first, the rate of tumble was thought to be negligible because it appeared to be
so small in the short time it was observed in the test movies. More careful data reduc-
tion, however, indicated that the module would be pointing almost backwards when it
functioned, showing that the tipoff moment was unacceptably large and the spin stabiliza-
tion was inadequate. Two design changes, supported by additional analysis, corrected
these deficiencies: a "zero-length" launcher was designed (the last point of contact of
the module with the lip of the launcher was at the center of gravity of the module) and a
"flywheel" was added at the longitudinal center of gravity of the module to increase its
rotational moment of inertia.
In making these changes, the diameter of the launch tube was enlarged; thus, the
tube no longer restrained the sating balls in the module so that they were free to fall or
be jarred out by logistic and boost environments before the signal to eject the module.
Unfortunately, this rather obvious mode of failure was not realized until after the
flight test when module function was not obtained. As mentioned earlier, a given
magnitude of spin was required to eject the safing balls. During the failure analysis,
it was realized that transverse shocks and vibration experienced prior to module re-
lease could produce sufficient force to free the balls and cause the captive module to
function. A fall-away collar was added to correct this problem. In final evaluation
tests, in which the module with this collar was ejected in the atmosphere, the module
still underwent an unacceptable rate of tumble. Even though the analysis indicated the
aerodynamic loads were negligible, subsequent tests were transferred to the vacuum
chamber, wherein successful ejection was obtained. In subsequent flight tests, the
device worked successfully. The original and final design configurations are shown in
figure 5.
SUGGESTIONSFOR MINIMIZING MISTAKES IN MECHANISM DESIGN
As is obvious from the foregoing discussion, the design and development of a
mechanism is not generally a one man or even a one department undertaking, but in-
volves three main activities: design, analysis, and testing. However, the predominant
or leading role inherently falls to the design group. If the mechanism does not perform
properly, the blame, either in full or in part, ultimately falls on the design; even if
circumstances permit or are created to spread and obscure this blame, it is of little
consequence because, in the majority of the cases, it is upto the design group to
resolve the problem.
If it turns out that the analysis or testing efforts have not adequately supported the
design, the blame must be shared by the design group for not making the proper re-
quests or for not challenging or properly monitoring these support efforts. Even in
matters defined as problems in quality control and manufacturing, design generally
becomes involved. What then can the design group do to minimize the type of mistakes
described ?
The problems just described occurred in spite of the fact that each design was
formally reviewed periodically by a design-review committee. Generally, conceptual,
interim, and final design reviews were held. These reviews uncovered some, but ob-
viously not all, the weaknesses in the design. It is felt that, in addition to these peri-
odic reviews, a means to provide a disciplined, continuous monitoring of the design is
needed. It is proposed that this be done through a small control group within the design
group; for lack of a better name, this group can be called the Design Parameters Group
(DPG) and would be responsible to the design leader or supervisor. This group should
be activated at the outset of any new design effort and one of its main functions would be
to ask the right questions in a disciplined rather than haphazard way. To accomplish
this, it is suggested that the DPG should establish the following documents or checklist
for each design subsystem and should administer the checklists on a continuing basis.
These documents are the tools designed to precipitate pertinent questions before the
fact, so that potential problem areas can be revealed before the mechanism fails to per-
form in qualification testing or end-item usage. The functions of the DPG are shown
in figure 6.
Design Parameters and Requirements Checklist
This checklist is a comprehensive list of the design requirements derived from
systems and performance requirements. Many of these design parameters could be
derived only with appropriate analysis, which would be done under the cognizance of the
DPG. This list should be kept current as the design evolves and requirements change,
and the list should be used as a checklist to ensure that the design meets each require-
ment. Then, a completed checklist should be manifested at each formal design review.
An example of this checklist applied to the RAD is shown in figure 7.
Design- Limits Checklist
As is illustrated in the preceding examples, failures often occur because no effort
was made to determine how marginal the design was. The design limits checklist would
contain a definition and a list of the design limits; thus, design margins would be shown.
Of course, this procedure is almost always done in stress analysis but not in functional
aspects of the mechanism. In many cases, analyses and testing would be required in
order to complete this list; thus, the list would be used to point out where additional
analysis and testing should be done. A simplified example of a partial design limits
checklist is shown in figure 8.
Test-Requirements Checklist
Test requirements should be generated by the design group and, indirectly, by the
analysis group when test data are needed to supplement analysis. In conjunction with
the administration of the design requirements, the DPG should prepare test require-
ments that would form the basis for test plans and requests. Then, the test results
should be evaluated against the design requirements by the DPG. How such a check-
list would be formulated is illustrated in figure 9.
Failur e-Mode-Analysis Checklist
As soon as the design is defined sufficiently, the failure-mode analysis should be
made by the DPG in conjunction with quality-control personnel. The failure mode
analysis checklist consists essentially of a systematic listing of all postulated modes
of failure that could occur and a statement of what has or will be done to prevent failures
or to ensure that failures cannot occur. This checklist should be kept current, updated
with each design change, and submitted to the design-review committee. How this
checklist could be applied to the RAD is shown in figure 10.
Why Won't It Work List
The critiquing engineer should list questions for each mechanism, asking what can
or will keep the mechanism from working as intended; then, the critiquing engineer
should obtain or provide the answers. Although this list will overlap the failure mode
analysis checklist, it will supplement it by asking questions from a different viewpoint.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As was stated earlier, these checklists are intended to serve as tools to precipi-
tate the questions that would uncover potential problems before the fact. To gain maxi-
mum benefit from the checklists, a proper or healthy attitude must be generated and
maintained. Part of the task of the mechanism designer is to dispell the notion that "any-
body can build a mechanism." The designer must convince critics (and helpers) that
mechanisms are not so simple and trivial that development testing is not necessary.
However, the designer has to develop a receptive attitude and guard against nurturing a
defensive attitude. The designer should not be reticent in seeking expert help in spe-
cialized areas such as friction and lubrication problems and materials selection. Even
in areas of his specialty, an independent review by other designers should not be
discouraged.
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Figure 1.- Illustration of the piercer problem.
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Figure 3.- Orientation problem.
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Figure 4.- Moisture-absorption problem.
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Figure 5.- Module-launcher problem.
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Figure 6. - Functions of the design parameters group.
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Figure 7.- Design-requirements checklist.
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Figure 10.- Failure-mode-analysis checklist.
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